Much recent research has sought to explain the cyclical amplitude of unemployment ‡uctuations in the US. This paper shows that ampli…cation of the cyclical variation of unemployment can be obtained from adding two very simple features to an otherwise standard model of the aggregate labor market, namely downward sloped short run labor demand and endogenous job destruction. This generalized model is able to match more closely the cyclicality of both job …nding and employment to unemployment ‡ows observed in US data. Contrary to standard models, the model can generate ampli…-cation while maintaining realistic surplus to employment relationships. In addition, we uncover a novel source of ampli…cation of cyclical shocks that is generated by the interaction of countercyclical unemployment in ‡ows and job creation.
Much recent research has sought to explain the cyclical amplitude of unemployment ‡uctuations in the US. Shimer (2005) has shown that a leading model of the aggregate labor market, the Mortensen-Pissarides (MP) model, cannot explain this cyclical volatility.
A common solution to this problem proposed in subsequent literature has been to invoke rigidity in the wages of newly hired workers (see among others Shimer, 2004; and Hall, 2005) . However, the empirical validity of such an assumption has been questioned by Haefke, Sonntag, & van Rens (2007) , and by Pissarides (2007) .
1 This paper takes a di¤erent approach.
We show that ampli…cation of the cyclical volatility of unemployment can instead be obtained simply by adding two very conventional features to the standard search model, namely downward sloped short run demand for labor and endogenous job destruction.
The motivation for these additional features is simple. First, downward sloped labor demand is motivated by the fact that other production inputs, notably capital, are not fully ‡exible at cyclical frequencies.
2 Second, the inclusion of endogenous job destruction is informed by empirical evidence that part of the cyclical upswing in unemployment in times of recession is accounted for by increased ‡ows from employment to unemployment. 3 However, incorporating these two conventional features simultaneously is not a trivial exercise. We show that it is also not a daunting one. In particular, downward sloped labor demand implies that …rms face a non-linear production technology which poses a number of theoretical challenges. First, this complicates wage setting because the surplus generated by each of the employment relationships within a …rm is not the same (e.g. "the"marginal worker generates less surplus than infra-marginal workers). In section 1, we derive a very intuitive and explicit wage bargaining solution for this environment, something that has been considered challenging in recent research (see Cooper, Haltiwanger & Willis, 2007; and 1 This echoes the earlier results of Baker, Gibbs, & Holmstrom (1994) who observe substantial wage ‡exibility among new hires in data for a particular …rm (see especially their Figure II) . 2 Another motivation for downward sloped labor demand is the existence of imperfect product market competition. For a model with this feature (but with exogenous job destruction) see Rotemberg (2006) . 3 See Perry (1972) ; Marston (1976) ; Blanchard & Diamond (1990) ; Elsby, Michaels, & Solon (2007) ; Fujita & Ramey (2007) ; Pissarides (2007) ; Shimer (2007) ; and Yashiv (2006) . Hobijn & Sahin, 2007) . In particular, the solution is a very natural generalization of the wage bargaining solution in the standard MP model. The simplicity of our solution is therefore a useful addition to the literature. 4 The wage bargaining solution then enables us to characterize the properties of the optimal labor demand policy of an individual …rm in the presence of idiosyncratic …rm heterogeneity.
An interesting by-product of this exercise is that the optimal labor demand solution in the generalized model is analogous to that of a model of kinked hiring costs in the spirit of Bentolila & Bertola (1990) , but where the hiring cost is endogenously determined by frictions in the labor market. Thus, the correspondence between the two major approaches to the economics of aggregate labor markets -search and matching models and employment adjustment cost models -sharpens in the process of generalizing the standard search model.
A second analytical challenge in models with a non-linear production technology and idiosyncratic heterogeneity is that aggregation of microeconomic behavior is not straightforward, because a representative …rm interpretation of the model doesn't exist. To address this, in section 2 we develop a method for aggregating the behavior of individual …rms that holds for a wide class of optimal labor demand policies at the microeconomic level. In particular, we are able to solve for the equilibrium distribution of employment across …rms, which in turn allows us to determine the level of the aggregate (un)employment stock. In addition, we also provide a related method that allows us to solve for aggregate unemployment ‡ows (hires and separations) implied by microeconomic behavior. Together, these characterize the aggregate equilibrium of the model economy.
These aggregation results allow us to quantitatively evaluate our model, which we turn to in section 3. In particular, we show that a standard calibration of our generalized model 4 Related models with endogenous separations such as Cooper et al. (2007) and Hobijn & Sahin (2007) have set worker bargaining power to zero in order to derive wages. Acemoglu & Hawkins (2006) characterize wages in a model with exogenous separations, but they focus on a time to hire aspect to job creation, which leads to a more challenging bargaining problem. Our solution is analogous to the wage bargaining solutions derived by Smith (1999) , Cahuc & Wasmer (2001) , and Krause & Lubik (2007) for models with exogenous job destruction.
can more closely match the observed cyclical variation of both the job …nding rate and the employment to unemployment transition rate in the US, and is a substantial improvement on the basic MP model. A potential concern in models, such as this, that incorporate countercyclical job destruction has been that they often cannot generate the observed procyclicality of vacancies (Shimer, 2005; Mortensen & Nagypal, 2007b) . Importantly, we …nd that our model makes considerable progress in this regard: Our calibration of the model generates approximately 3/4 of the observed comovement between vacancies and output per worker.
Moreover, we suggest that the remaining procyclicality is likely due to procyclical job-to-job ‡ows that are observed in the data (Fallick & Fleischman, 2004) but are abstracted from in the present paper.
The common factor that generates both the procyclicality of the job …nding rate and of vacancies in the model is the procyclicality of desired job creation. To uncover the processes underlying this, in section 4 we derive a simple approximation to the decline in job creation following an adverse aggregate shock in the generalized model, analogous to the method employed by Shimer (2005) and Mortensen & Nagypal (2007a,b) . This exercise reveals two sources of ampli…cation. The …rst generalizes a well-known result that the standard MP model is consistent with observed unemployment cyclicality if the average ‡ow surplus to employment relationships is su¢ ciently small. 5 We show that an analogous result occurs in the generalized model if a weighted average of the average and marginal ‡ow surplus is su¢ ciently small. However, because downward sloped labor demand implies that the marginal surplus will be smaller than the average surplus, the generalized model can deliver ampli…cation of the job creation response to aggregate shocks at the same time as preserving a sizeable average surplus from employment relationships.
6 This is important because recent 5 Intuitively, a small surplus to employment relationships implies that small reductions in the productivity of labor (as in a recession) quickly exhaust the surplus and lead …rms to cut back substantially on hiring. See Mortensen & Pissarides (1994) , Hagedorn & Manovskii (2005) , and Costain & Reiter (2005) . 6 One might imagine that a symmetric logic holds on the supply side of the labor market if there is heterogeneity in workers' valuations of leisure so that "the" marginal worker obtains a low surplus from employment. Interestingly, Mortensen & Nagypal (2007a) argue that this is not the case. They show that research has suggested that the average surplus required for the standard model to match the observed cyclicality of the job …nding rate is too small (Mortensen & Nagypal, 2007a ).
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Our results also suggest a second, more novel source of ampli…cation that is generated by the interaction of heterogeneous …rms and downward sloped labor demand. Following a reduction in aggregate labor demand, low productivity …rms wish to shed more workers, and high productivity …rms wish to hire fewer workers. Thus in ‡ows into the unemployment pool rise, and out ‡ows from the unemployment pool fall, ceteris paribus, causing unemployment to rise. To restore equilibrium in the model, hiring …rms must be convinced to hire enough workers to equate in ‡ows to out ‡ows once more. The model achieves this by allowing the labor market to slacken, so that unemployed workers become more abundant, and hiring (suitable) workers becomes less costly for …rms. With downward sloped labor demand, increased hiring retards the productivity of additional employment relationships, and so the labor market must slacken further, and unemployment must rise more, in order to return the economy back to equilibrium once again.
Section 5 of the paper discusses the broader implications of our analysis. We argue that the model developed in the paper provides a rich, yet analytically tractable model of the aggregate labor market in the short run. As such, we believe that this model will provide a useful laboratory for the cyclical analysis of aggregate labor markets in future empirical and theoretical research. In addition, we suggest that, by developing a model with a well-de…ned concept of a …rm, the analytical results derived here are a natural complement to recent research that has investigated the empirical implications of search frictions using establishment level data (Cooper, Haltiwanger & Willis, 2007; Davis, Faberman, & Haltiwanger, 2007) . Fiif …rms cannot di¤erentiate workers' types when making hiring decisions, they will base their decision on the average, rather than the marginal, valuation of leisure among the unemployed. The same is unlikely to be true of the model studied here, since …rms presumably know their production technology when making hiring decisions.
7 A small average surplus also jars with widespread evidence for the prevalence of long term employment relationships in the US economy, which researchers have taken to imply substantial rents to ongoing matches (Hall, 1982; Stevens, 2005) . nally, we emphasize the wider applicability of the aggregation results we derive as a method of characterizing aggregate labor market equilibrium in models without a representative …rm interpretation. Our aggregation results can be applied in exactly the same manner to other popular models of non-linear microeconomic behavior, such as non-convex adjustment cost models (Caballero, Engel, & Haltiwanger, 1997; Cooper, Haltiwanger, & Willis, 2004 ).
Our hope is that this will further our understanding of the macroeconomic implications of non-linearities in …rm level labor demand for the aggregate labor market.
The Firm' s Problem
In what follows we consider a model in which there is a mass of …rms, normalized to one, and a mass of potential workers equal to the labor force, L.
8 In order to hire unemployed workers, …rms must post vacancies. However, frictions in the labor market limit the rate at which unemployed workers and hiring …rms can meet. As is conventional in the search and matching literature, these frictions are embodied in a matching function,
that regulates the number of hires, M , that the economy can sustain given that there are V vacancies and U unemployed workers. We assume that M (U; V ) exhibits constant returns to scale.
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Vacancies posted by …rms are therefore …lled with probability q = M=V = M (U=V; 1) each period. Likewise, unemployed workers …nd jobs with probability f = M=U = M (1; V =U ). Thus, the ratio of aggregate vacancies to aggregate unemployment, V =U , is a su¢ cient statistic for the job …lling (q) and job …nding (f ) probabilities in the model. Taking these ‡ow probabilities as given, …rms choose their optimal level of 8 Assuming a …xed number of …rms is important for the model to depart from the standard MP model. Free entry would yield an economy of in…nitesimal …rms that converges to the MP limit. In principle, one could allow for costly …rm entry as a middle ground. We abstract from this in part for simplicity. But our choice is also informed by evidence in Davis and Haltiwanger (1992) . They …nd that, in manufacturing, establishment births account for 20% of job creation on average each year. While this is not a small number, the majority of job creation is clearly accounted for by incumbent establishments. For a model that explores the impact of …rm entry on job creation, see Garibaldi (2006) . 9 See Petrongolo & Pissarides (2001) for a summary of empirical evidence that suggests this is reasonable.
employment, to which we now turn.
Labor Demand
We consider a discrete time, in…nite horizon model in which …rms use labor, n, to produce output according to the production function, y = pxF (n) where F 0 > 0 and F 00 0. The latter is a key generalization of the standard MP model that we consider: When F 00 < 0, the marginal product of labor will decline with …rm employment, and thereby will generate a downward sloped demand for labor at the …rm level. p represents the state of aggregate labor demand, whereas x represents shocks that are idiosyncratic to an individual …rm.
We assume that the evolution of the latter idiosyncratic shocks is described by the c.d.f.
A typical …rm's decision problem is completely analogous to that in Mortensen & Pissarides (1994) , and is as follows. Firms observe the realization of their idiosyncratic shock,
x, at the beginning of a period. Given this, they then make their employment decision.
Speci…cally, they may choose to separate from part or all of their workforce, which we assume may be done at zero cost. Any such separated workers then join the unemployment pool in the subsequent period. Alternatively, …rms may hire workers by posting vacancies, v 0, at a ‡ow cost of c per vacancy. If a …rm posts vacancies, the matching process then matches these up with unemployed workers inherited from the previous period. After the matching process is complete, production and wage setting are performed simultaneously.
It follows that we can characterize the expected present discounted value of a …rm's pro…ts, (n 1 ; x), recursively as:
10 We adopt the convention of denoting lagged values with a subscript, 1 , and forward values with a prime, 0 .
where w (n; x) is the bargained wage in a …rm of size n and productivity x. A typical …rm seeks a level of employment that maximizes its pro…ts subject to a dynamic constraint on the evolution of a …rm's employment level. Speci…cally, …rms face frictions that limit the rate at which vacancies may be …lled: A vacancy posted in a given period will be …lled with probability q < 1 prior to production. Thus, the number of hires an individual …rm achieves is given by:
where n is the change in employment, and 1 + is an indicator that equals one when the …rm is hiring, and zero otherwise. Substituting the constraint, (2), into the …rm's value function, we obtain:
Note that the value function is not fully di¤erentiable in n: There is a kink in the value function around n = n 1 . This re ‡ects the (partial) irreversibility of separation decisions in the model. While …rms can shed workers costlessly, it is costly to reverse such a decision because hiring (posting vacancies) is costly. In this sense, the labor demand side is formally analogous to the kinked employment adjustment cost model of the form analyzed in Bentolila & Bertola (1990) , except that the per-worker hiring cost, c=q ( ), is endogenously determined.
In order to determine the …rm's optimal employment policy, we take the …rst-order conditions for hires and separations (i.e. conditional on n 6 = 0):
where D (n; x) R n (n; x 0 ) dG (x 0 jx) re ‡ects the marginal e¤ect of current employment decisions on the future value of the …rm. Equation (4) is quite intuitive. It states that the marginal product of labor (pxF 0 (n)) net of any hiring costs ( c q 1 + ), plus the discounted expected future marginal bene…ts from an additional unit of labor ( D (n; x)) must equal the marginal cost of labor (w (n; x) + w n (n; x) n). To provide a full characterization of the …rm's optimal employment policy, it remains to characterize the future marginal bene…ts from current employment decisions, D (n; x), and the wage bargaining solution, w (n; x), to which we now turn.
Wage Setting
The existence of frictions in the labor market implies that it is costly for …rms and workers to …nd alternative employment relationships. As a result, there exist quasi-rents over which the …rm and its workers must bargain. The assumption of constant marginal product in the standard MP model has the tractable implication that these rents are the same for all workers within a given …rm. It follows that …rms can bargain with each of their workers independently, because the rents of each individual employment relationship are independent of the rents of all other employment relationships.
However, because we allow for the possibility of downward-sloped labor demand (F 00 < 0), these rents will depend on the number of workers within a …rm. Intuitively, the rent that a …rm obtains from "the"marginal worker will be lower than the rent obtained on all inframarginal hires due to diminishing marginal product. An implication of the latter is that the multilateral dimension of the …rm's bargain with its many workers becomes important: The rents of each individual employment relationship within a …rm are no longer independent.
To take this into account, we adopt the bargaining solution of Stole & Zwiebel (1996) which generalizes the Nash solution to a setting with downward-sloped labor demand.
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Stole & Zwiebel present a game where the bargained wage is the same as the outcome of simple Nash bargaining over the marginal surplus. The game that supports this simple result is one in which a …rm negotiates with each of its workers in turn, and where the breakdown of a negotiation with any individual worker leads to the renegotiation of wages with all remaining workers.
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In accordance with timing of decisions each period, wages are set after employment has been determined. Thus, hiring costs are sunk at the time of wage setting, and the marginal surplus, which we denote as J (n; x), is equal to the marginal value of labor gross of the costs of hiring:
The surplus from an employment relationship for a worker is the additional utility a worker obtains from working in her current …rm over and above the utility she obtains from unemployment. The value of employment in a …rm of size n and productivity x, W (n; x), is given by:
While employed, a worker receives a ‡ow payo¤ equal to the bargained wage, w (n; x). She loses her job with (endogenous) probability s next period, upon which she ‡ows into the unemployment pool and obtains the value of unemployment, U 0 . With probability (1 s),
she retains her job and obtains the expected payo¤ of continued employment in her current …rm, W (n 0 ; x 0 ). Likewise, the value of unemployment to a worker is given by:
Unemployed workers receive ‡ow payo¤ b, which represents unemployment bene…ts and/or the value of leisure to a worker. They …nd a job next period with probability f , upon which they obtain the expected payo¤ from employment, W (n 0 ; x 0 ).
12 The intuition for the Stole & Zwiebel result is as follows. If the …rm has only one worker, the …rm and worker simply strike a Nash bargain. If a second worker is added, the …rm and the additional worker know that, if their negotiations break down, the …rm will agree to a Nash bargain with the remaining worker. By induction, then, the …rm approaches negotiations with the nth worker as if that worker were marginal. Therefore, the wage that solves the bargaining problem is that which maximizes the marginal surplus.
Wages are then the outcome of a Nash bargain between a …rm and its workers over the marginal surplus, with worker bargaining power denoted as :
Given this, we are able to derive a wage bargaining solution with the following simple structure:
Proposition 1 The bargained wage, w (n; x), solves the di¤erential equation
The intuition for (9) is quite straightforward. As in the MP model, wages are increasing in the worker's bargaining power, , the marginal product of labor, pxF 0 (n), workers'job …nding probability, f , the marginal costs of hiring for a …rm, c=q, and workers' ‡ow value of leisure, b. There is an additional term, however, in w n (n; x) n. To understand the intuition for this term, consider a …rm's negotiations with a given worker. If these negotiations break down, the …rm will have to pay its remaining workers a higher wage. The reason is that fewer workers imply that the marginal product of labor will be higher in the …rm, which will partially spillover into higher wages (w n n < 0). The more powerful this e¤ect is (the more negative is w n n), the more the …rm loses from a given breakdown of negotiations with a worker, and the more workers can extract a higher wage from the bargain.
In what follows, we will adopt the simple assumption that the production function is of the Cobb-Douglas form, F (n) = n with 1. Given this, the di¤erential equation for the wage function, (9), has the following simple solution:
Setting = 1 yields the discrete time analogue to the familiar wage bargaining solution for the MP model.
The Firm' s Optimal Employment Policy
Now that we have obtained a solution for the bargained wage at a given …rm, we can combine this with the …rm's …rst-order condition for employment and thereby characterize the …rms optimal employment policy, which speci…es the …rm's optimal employment as a function of its state, n (n 1 ; x). Thus, combining (4) and (9) we obtain:
Given (11) we are able to characterize the …rm's optimal employment policy as follows:
Proposition 2 The optimal employment policy of a …rm is of the form
where the functions R v ( ) and R ( ) satisfy
The …rm's optimal employment policy will be similar to that depicted in Figure 1 . It is characterized by two reservation values for the …rm's idiosyncratic shock, R (n 1 ) and R v (n 1 ). Speci…cally, for su¢ ciently bad idiosyncratic shocks (x < R (n 1 ) in the …gure), …rms will shed workers until the …rst-order condition in the separation regime, (14), is satis…ed. Moreover, for su¢ ciently good idiosyncratic realizations (x > R v (n 1 ) in the …gure), …rms will post vacancies and hire workers until the …rst-order condition in the hiring regime, (13), is satis…ed. Finally, for intermediate values of x, …rms freeze employment so that n = n 1 . This occurs as a result of the kink in the …rm's pro…ts at n = n 1 , which arises because hiring is costly to …rms, while separations are costless.
To complete our characterization of the …rm's optimal employment policy, it remains to determine the marginal e¤ect of current employment decisions on future pro…ts of the …rm, D (n; x). It turns out that we can show that D (n; x) has the following recursive structure:
The marginal e¤ect of current employment on future pro…ts, D (n; x), is given by
where
Equation (15) is a contraction mapping in D (n; ), and therefore has a unique …xed point.
The intuition for this result is as follows. Because of the existence of kinked adjustment costs (costly hiring and costless separations) the …rm's employment will be frozen next period with positive probability. In the event that the …rm freezes employment next period
, the current employment level persists into the next period and so do the marginal e¤ects of the …rm's current employment choice. Proposition 3 shows that these To get a sense for how the microeconomic behavior of the model works, we next derive the response of an individual …rm's employment policy function to changes in (exogenous) aggregate productivity, p, and the (endogenous) aggregate vacancy-unemployment ratio, .
To do this, we assume that the evolution of idiosyncratic shocks is described by:
x with probability 1
Thus, idiosyncratic shocks display some persistence ( < 1) with innovations drawn from the distribution functionG. Given this, we can establish the following result:
Proposition 4 If idiosyncratic shocks, x, evolve according to (17), then the e¤ects of the aggregate state variables p and on a …rm's optimal employment policy are
The intuition behind these marginal e¤ects is quite simple. First, note that increases in aggregate productivity, p, shift a …rm's employment policy function downwards in Figure 1 .
Thus, unsurprisingly, when labor is more productive, a …rm of a given idiosyncratic productivity, x, is more likely to hire workers, and less likely to shed workers. Second, increases in the vacancy-unemployment ratio, , unambiguously reduce the likelihood that a …rm of a given idiosyncratic productivity will hire workers (R v increases for all n). The reason is that higher implies a lower job-…lling probability, q, and thereby raises the marginal cost of hiring a worker, c=q. Moreover, higher implies a tighter labor market and therefore higher wages (from (9)) so that the marginal cost of labor rises as well. Both of these e¤ects cause …rms to cut back on hiring. Finally, increases in the vacancy-unemployment ratio, , will reduce the likelihood of shedding workers for small …rms, but will raise it for large …rms. This occurs because higher has countervailing e¤ects on the separation decision of …rms. On the one hand, higher reduces the job-…lling probability, q, rendering separation decisions less reversible (since future hiring becomes more costly), so that …rms become less likely to destroy jobs. On the other hand, higher implies a tighter labor market, higher wages, and thereby a higher marginal cost of labor, rendering …rms more likely to shed workers. The former e¤ect is dominant in small …rms because the likelihood of their hiring in the future is high.
Aggregation and Steady State Equilibrium 2.1 Aggregation
Since we are ultimately interested in the equilibrium behavior of the aggregate unemployment rate, in this section we take on the task of aggregating up the microeconomic behavior of section 1 to the macroeconomic level. This exercise is non-trivial because each …rm's employment is a non-linear function of the …rm's lagged employment, n 1 , and its idiosyncratic shock realization, x. As a result, there is no representative …rm interpretation that will aid aggregation of the model.
To this end, we are able to derive the following result which characterizes the steady state aggregate employment stock and ‡ows in the model:
Proposition 5 If idiosyncratic shocks, x, evolve according to (17), the steady state c.d.f. of employment across …rms is given by
Thus, the steady state aggregate employment stock is given by
and the steady state aggregate number of separations, S, and hires, M , is equal to
Proposition 5 is useful because it provides a tight link between the solution for the microeconomic behavior of an individual …rm and the macroeconomic outcomes of that behavior.
Speci…cally, it shows that once we know the optimal employment policy function of an in-dividual …rm (that is, the functions R (n) and R v (n)) then we can directly obtain solutions for the aggregate employment stock and ‡ows. An important feature to note about Proposition 5 is its generality. Speci…cally, it allows one to generate analytically the steady state aggregate employment stock and labor ‡ows for any given employment policy function at the microeconomic level, not just that derived above. In addition, the expressions for aggregate employment and ‡ows are straightforward to compute numerically.
The three components of Proposition 5 are also quite intuitive. The steady state distribution of employment across …rms, (19), is obtained by setting the ‡ows into and out of the mass H (n) equal to each other. The in ‡ow into the mass comes from …rms who reduce their employment from above n to below n. There are [1 H (n)] such …rms, and since they are reducing their employment, it follows from (12) that each …rm will reduce its employment below n with probability equal to
. Similarly, one can show that the out ‡ow from the mass is
. Setting in ‡ows equal to out ‡ows yields the expression for
15 Given this, the expression for aggregate employment, (20), follows directly.
The intuition for the …nal expression for aggregate ‡ows in Proposition 5, (21), is as follows. Recall that the mass of …rms whose employment switches from above some number
. Equation (21) states that the aggregate number of separations in the economy is equal to the cumulative sum of these downward switches in employment over n. To get a sense for this, consider the following simple discrete example. Imagine an economy with two separating …rms: one that switches from three employees to one, and another that switches from two employees to one. It follows that two …rms have switched from > 2 employees to 2 employees, and one …rm switched from > 1 to 1 employee. Thus, the cumulative sum of downward employment switches is three, which is also equal to the total number of separations in the economy.
Steady State Equilibrium
Given (19), (20), and (21), the conditions for aggregate steady state equilibrium can be obtained as follows. First note that each …rm's optimal policy function, summarized by the functions R (n) and R v (n) in Proposition 2, depends on two aggregate variables: The (exogenous) state of aggregate productivity, p; and the (endogenous) ratio of aggregate vacancies to aggregate unemployment, V =U , which uniquely determines the ‡ow probabilities q and f .
In the light of Proposition 5, we can characterize the aggregate steady state of the economy for a given p in terms of two relationships. The …rst, the job creation condition, is simply equation (20), which we re-state here in terms of unemployment, making explicit its dependence on the aggregate vacancy-unemployment ratio, :
(22) simply speci…es the level of aggregate employment that is consistent with the in ‡ows to (hires) and out ‡ows from (separations) aggregate employment being equal as a function of . The second steady state condition is the Beveridge Curve relation. This is derived from the di¤erence equation that governs the evolution of unemployment over time:
(23) simply states that the change in the unemployment stock over time, U 0 , is equal to the in ‡ow into the unemployment pool -the number of separations, S -less the out ‡ow from the unemployment pool -the job …nding probability, f , times the stock of unemployed workers, U . In steady state, aggregate unemployment will be stationary, so that we obtain the steady state unemployment relation:
The steady state value of the vacancy-unemployment ratio, , is co-determined by (22) and (24).
An Illustrative Simulation
Shimer (2005) 
where U BC is de…ned in (24) and is the steady state unemployment level. In US data, the monthly out ‡ow rate from unemployment is on the order of f = 0:45 (see Shimer, 2007) , implying that around half of the gap between actual and steady state unemployment is closed over the course of a month. That is, deviations of unemployment from steady state are very short-lived, and thus steady state responses to aggregate shocks are very good, and intuitive, approximations to the true dynamic response of the model.
Calibration. The empirical moments that we seek to match are summarized in Table 1 .
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In particular, we want to get sense of the cyclical variation in the job …nding rate implied by the model. To assess this, we calibrate the model as follows. We take a time period to be equal to one week, which in practice acts as a good approximation to the continuous time nature of unemployment ‡ows (see Hagedorn & Manovskii, 2005) . We then assume that the matching function is of the conventional Cobb-Douglas form, M = U V . Given this setup, it is possible to solve for …rms'optimal employment policy in closed form, the details of which are in Appendix A. We then use the aggregation results of Proposition 5 to derive numerically the aggregate job creation, (22), and Beveridge curve, (24), conditions, and thereby solve the model.
Given this, we then target a mean weekly in ‡ow probability of s = 0:0075 to be consistent with data in Shimer (2005a) which reports summary statistics for the monthly job …nding probability, rather than for the hazard, which is what matters for unemployment ‡ows. 17 An issue that can arise when using a Cobb-Douglas matching function in a discrete time setting is that the ‡ow probabilities f and q are not necessarily bounded above by 1. This issue does not arise here due to the short time period of one week. to derive an elasticity with respect to output per worker of -2.48.
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In addition to these, we also target the workers'opportunity cost of employment, b, and the ‡ow cost of a vacancy, c, as follows. As suggested by Mortensen & Nagypal (2007a) and Hall & Milgrom (2008) , we target b to be approximately 0.7 of output per worker, Y =N . Finally, we target the elasticity of average wages of newly hired workers to be equal to 0.94, based on the results of Haefke et al. (2007) . 20 We target the elasticity of the average 18 We are grateful to Robert Shimer for posting his estimates of ‡ow transition rates among labor market states from the CPS Gross Flows data on his webpage. 19 We want to equate the per worker hiring cost c=q to 14% of quarterly wages, 0:14 [12 E (w)], since there are 12 weeks per quarter. Then note that the implied weekly job …lling probability is given by q = = 0:129 0:72 0:6 = 0:16. Piecing this together yields c=E (w) = 0:16 0:14 12 = 0:27. 20 We target an elasticity of 0.94 based on Haefke et al.'s baseline results. It is worth bearing in mind that this is at the upper end of the range of estimates presented in their paper.
wages of newly hired workers rather than the elasticity of average wages of all workers for two reasons. First, it is well known empirically that the wages of workers in ongoing relationships are rigid (see among others Card & Hyslop, 1997) , which is at odds with the assumption of Nash wage setting that we employ here. 21 Second, it is also well known that it is the ‡exibility of wages of new hires, rather than of ongoing workers, that is relevant to the cyclicality of the job …nding rate implied by search and matching models of the labor market such as the one studied here (Shimer, 2004; Hall, 2005) .
We thus have six moments that we seek to match, and seven model parameters:
(production function, F (n) = n ), b ( ‡ow value of leisure), c ( ‡ow cost per vacancy), (worker bargaining power), L (potential labor force), 22 (arrival probability of idiosyncratic shocks), and (lower support of idiosyncratic shock distribution). We therefore set to be equal to the conventional 2/3, 23 and evaluate the steady state response of the model over a grid of values for the remaining six parameters. Given the results of this exercise, we pick the parameter values that most closely match the six target moments italicized in Table 1 .
The parameter results of this numerical exercise are reported in Table 2 , and the implied model outcomes are in Table 3 . The results are very encouraging: The model is able to match quite closely the target moments in italics in Table 1 .
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Of particular interest is that the model can also match the observed elasticity of the job …nding rate with respect to output per worker even though this moment was not targeted when calibrating the model. 21 Indeed, in the calibration that follows, the Nash wage setting assumption implies an elasticity of average worker wages with respect to output per worker of approximately 1. This overstates the cyclicality of ongoing wages observed in the data, which display an elasticity with respect to output per worker of approximately 0.5 (see Solon, Barsky, & Parker, 1994; Pissarides, 2007) . 22 Taken literally, L represents the labor force as a fraction of the number of the number of …rms in the model economy. In reality, however, L is more accurately described as the labor force as a fraction of the number of production units in the economy. The latter may correspond to a small …rm, a small division within a large …rm etc. For this reason, we do not calibrate L directly. 23 Strictly speaking, labor's share will be more than 2/3 in the model due to surplus sharing. We use a value of = 2=3 for simplicity. 24 Although the …t with the target moments is good, it is not perfect. This is due to some coarseness in the grid over which we evaluated the model. However, if anything, we err on the side of generating less ampli…cation since we overstate the ‡ow surplus (b is a smaller fraction of output per worker) and overstate the ‡exibility in the wages of new hires relative to the target moments. 
Match target moments in italics in Table 1 This makes substantial progress relative to the standard MP model. To see this, as a benchmark for comparison Table 3 Pissarides '(2007) calibration of the standard model with endogenous job destruction obtains an elasticity of f equal to 1.54. Thus, the standard MP model, with or without endogenous job destruction, appears to be able explain up to one half of the observed elasticity of the job …nding rate. The results of Table 3 suggest that the generalized model studied here 25 It is possible to rewrite the MP model in terms of b=(Y =N ) and c=E [w] . We impose the conditions b=(Y =N ) = 0:67 and c=E[w] = 0:26. We then set = 0:128 to target f = 0:112; = 0:625 to target an elasticity of new hire's wages of 1.1; = 0:825 to target a mean level of s = 0:0078; and = 0:03 to target an elasticity of s equal to -2.46. Parameter values for = 2/3 case as in Table 2. can plausibly account for all of the observed cyclical comovement between f and output per worker.
Cyclicality of Vacancies. Until now we have ignored the cyclicality of vacancies generated by our generalized model. Readers of Shimer (2005), however, will recall that the standard MP search and matching model also fails to match the observed cyclical volatility in the vacancy rate in the US. Speci…cally, as shown in Table 1 , the empirical elasticity of the vacancy rate with respect to output per worker in the US derived by Shimer (2005) is equal to 3:68. The implied elasticity from Shimer's calibration of the standard MP model is 0:995 0:027=0:020 = 1:34 (see Shimer, 2005 , Table 3 ). Moreover, the calibration of the standard MP model with = 1 in Table 3 reveals that the model with endogenous job destruction performs even worse on this dimension, yielding a very mild countercyclical vacancy elasticity of 0:28. This arises because countercyclical job destruction leads to an o¤setting increase in hires in times of recession to maintain balance between unemployment in ‡ows and out ‡ows, and thereby stymies the procyclicality of vacancies (Shimer, 2005) .
The analogous elasticity generated by our simulation of the generalized model studied here is 2:80. This is clearly a substantial improvement over the standard model, especially
given that the generalized model incorporates countercyclical job destruction. However, there remains a question of why the generalized model, which matches the cyclicality of job …nding and employment to unemployment transition rates so well, cannot fully explain the cyclicality of vacancies. We believe that the answer is that a complete understanding of the cyclical behavior of vacancies requires an understanding of the processes underlying job-tojob employment ‡ows, a phenomenon that we abstract from in our analysis of unemployment ‡ows. To see why, note the following identity that relates the job-…lling rate, q, vacancies (or job openings), V , and the numbers (not the hazard rates) ‡owing from unemployment to employment, U E, and from job to job, EE:
Log di¤erentiation of this identity yields:
where ' is the share of total hires that originates from unemployment. Recent research has
shown that job-to-job ‡ows (EE) are substantially procyclical and account for approximately 60% of total hires using Current Population Survey data from 1994 onwards (Fallick & Fleischman, 2004) . Equation (27) shows that the procyclicality of EE ‡ows must therefore contribute substantially to the procyclicality of vacancies observed in the data. For this reason, we feel that the elasticity of vacancies obtained from the generalized model without on-the-job search may in fact be quite reasonable: If we were able to match the empirical elasticity, we would implicitly be over-explaining the procyclicality of vacancies. For the same reason, however, we also feel that extending the model to account for job-to-job ‡ows is an important task for future research.
Understanding Ampli…cation
Approximating the Cyclicality of Job Creation. Proposition 6 For small , the horizontal shift in the JC condition induced by a change in aggregate productivity, p, is given approximately by
where ! is the steady state employment share of hiring …rms, andp apl + (1 ) mpl where apl and mpl are respectively the average and marginal product of labor of the averagesized …rm, and
()
.
Corollary 1
The elasticity of the vacancy-unemployment ratio to aggregate productivity in the = 1 case (Mortensen & Pissarides, 1994 ) is approximately equal to
Equation (29) extends results presented in Mortensen & Nagypal (2007a) for the standard MP model with exogenous job destruction to the endogenous job destruction case. It echoes
Mortensen & Nagypal's results in that it shows that the cyclical response of the vacancyunemployment ratio, , is ampli…ed in the endogenous job destruction case when the average ‡ow surplus to employment relationships, p b, is small. Intuitively, when the ‡ow surplus is small, small reductions in aggregate productivity, p, can easily exhaust that surplus and lead …rms to cut back substantially on hiring. Thus, to incentivize …rms to hire once more and thereby restore equilibrium, the model must allow the labor market to slacken, and labor market tightness to fall, substantially.
Equation (28) generalizes this result to the case of downward sloped labor demand and endogenous job destruction. Inspection of (29) and (28) reveals that there are two ways that the addition of downward sloped labor demand can potentially yield ampli…cation of the response of labor market tightness (and thereby of the job …nding rate, f = 1 ) to changes in aggregate productivity. The …rst is that the e¤ective surplus that matters for ampli…cation is now given by byp b, and this is smaller than the average ‡ow surplus. The reason is that the e¤ective ‡ow surplus,p b, is now a weighted average of the average and marginal ‡ow surplus. When the demand for labor slopes downward, the marginal surplus will be smaller than the average surplus, because infra-marginal employment relationships are more productive. This provides a sense for why the numerical exercise above is able to generate greater volatility in even when the average ‡ow surplus is relatively large: It is because the marginal ‡ow surplus is relatively small in the simulation.
It's important to stress that while the model implies a small marginal surplus, it does allow for a substantial average ‡ow surplus to employment relationships. This stands in marked contrast to the standard MP model. For instance, Mortensen and Nagypal (2007a) report that their preferred estimate of the average ‡ow match surplus is 1 b=(Y =N ) 1 = 1 0:73 1 = 37 percent, which is comparable to, though still somewhat less than, what we obtain (see Table 3 ). They …nd that under this calibration, the standard MP model is able to account for only about one half of the ampli…cation generated by the model developed here. When endogenous job destruction is added to the standard ( = 1) model, Pissarides 26 Equation (28) also suggests that there is an additional e¤ect at work in the form of the variable !, the steady state employment share of hiring …rms. To understand the signi…cance of this term, note that in the standard MP model with ‡at labor demand (the special case where = 1), ! is equal to 1. When = 1, a …rm that reduces its employment will shed all of its workers since, if one worker is unpro…table at a …rm, all workers are unpro…table.
Similarly, when = 1, if it is pro…table to hire one worker, it is pro…table to hire any number of workers. Thus shedding …rms have zero employment, and all of steady state employment is accounted for by hiring …rms in the standard MP model.
The latter is a useful point of contrast with the model with downward sloped labor demand and endogenous job destruction. Because of downward sloped labor demand, shedding …rms do not reduce their employment to zero because reducing employment replenishes the marginal product of labor in those …rms. Likewise, hiring …rms'desired employment level is bounded because additional hiring depletes the marginal product of labor. Hence ! will be less than unity, and inspection of (28) and (29) reveals that this will lead to greater ampli…cation relative to the standard MP model.
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The intuition for this e¤ect is related to the interaction of downward sloped labor demand and heterogeneous …rms. Following a reduction in aggregate productivity, shedding …rms wish to shed more workers, and hiring …rms wish to hire fewer workers. Thus, in ‡ows into the unemployment pool rise, and out ‡ows from the unemployment pool fall, ceteris paribus, and unemployment rises. To return the model to steady state, hiring …rms must be convinced to hire enough workers to equate in ‡ows to out ‡ows once more. The model achieves this by allowing the job …lling probability, q ( ), to rise (and labor market tightness, , to fall) so that hiring becomes less costly for …rms. However, when the demand for labor slopes downward, additional hiring reduces the marginal product of labor, making additional employment relationships less attractive to hiring …rms. As a result, the job …lling probability, q ( ) must rise (and hence must fall) more to convince these …rms to increase hiring and return the economy back to steady state once more.
A natural question in the light of this is how much of the cyclicality of job creation generated by the model can be attributed to small surplus to marginal employment relationships on the one hand, and to the interaction of endogenous job destruction with job creation on the other. To get a sense for this, Table 4 reports outcomes for a special case of the generalized model that preserves downward sloped labor demand ( = 2=3), but which switches o¤ endogenous job destruction.
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As before, we calibrate this exogenous job destruction 27 The reader may worry whether (1 ) (p b) c is positive or not. To see that it is, note that we can rewrite it as (1 )
b c , and observe from equations (13) and (14) that it is, in fact, the marginal ‡ow surplus of a …rm, and therefore must be positive. 28 This special case of the model is formally analogous to the model analyzed in Cahuc & Wasmer (2001) and Krause & Lubik (2007) . Krause & Lubik …nd much less cyclicality in the job …nding rate in their calibration. This is because the ‡ow surplus to employment relationships is very large in their parameterization (b as a Table 3 . 29 This exercise yields an elasticity of the job …nding rate equal to 2:48, which is lower than the value of 3:24 derived for the model with endogenous job destruction.
This suggests that, while the majority of the procyclicality in job …nding generated by the model is attributable to small marginal surplus, the addition of endogenous job destruction enhances this result, and this second e¤ect is also not small.
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Summary and Discussion
This paper has shown that the addition of two very simple features -downward sloped short run labor demand and endogenous job destruction -to an otherwise standard model of the aggregate labor market can help explain the observed cyclical variation in the job …nding rate, the employment to unemployment transition rate, and vacancies observed in US data. We show that this is driven by two e¤ects. First, cyclicality in job creation is generated by the fact that marginal employment relationships generate a low surplus in the short run. Small fraction of output per worker is approximately equal to 0.1). 29 Speci…cally, it is possible to rewrite the model with exogenous job destruction in terms of b=(Y =N ) and c=E [w] . We then impose the conditions b=(Y =N ) = 0:67 and c=E[w] = 0:26, and choose and to match f = 0:112 and an elasticity of wages of 1.1. Setting = 0:128 and = 0:517 achieves this.
30 It is also true that the model with exogenous job destruction yields greater procyclicality in vacancies. However, as shown in Shimer (2005) and Mortensen & Nagypal (2007b) , this is simply a side-e¤ect of the (counterfactual) lack of any countercyclical movement in separations in that version of the model. aggregate disturbances quickly exhaust this surplus and lead to substantial reductions in hiring. Importantly, however, due to downward sloped labor demand, low marginal surplus is nevertheless consistent with a sizeable surplus to the average employment relationship, contrary to the standard search model. Second, increased job destruction in recessions must be soaked up by increased hiring in equilibrium. With downward sloped labor demand, increased hiring diminishes the value of additional employment relationships to …rms. As a result, hiring …rms are less willing to soak up the separations of shedding …rms, and unemployment rises more in the wake of a recession. Calibration of the model to available moments suggests that, while the majority of the cyclicality in job creation is attributable to small marginal surplus, both of these mechanisms appear to be quantitatively signi…cant.
In the course of establishing these results, we also provide a rich, yet analytically tractable model of the aggregate labor market in the short run. As such, we believe that this model will provide a useful laboratory for the cyclical analysis of aggregate labor markets in future empirical and theoretical research. A number of avenues arise naturally in the light of this. First, the model has a well-de…ned concept of a …rm and so lends itself to estimation using establishment level data. As a result, the analytical framework developed here will complement recent research e¤orts that have sought to solve and estimate search models using numerical methods (e.g. Cooper, Haltiwanger & Willis, 2007) .
A second natural extension relates to the aggregation results derived in the analysis of section 2. Speci…cally, we provide a very simple and general approach to deriving both the aggregate unemployment stock and ‡ows in non-linear models without representative …rms such as the one studied here. An obvious extension is to apply these results to other popular models of non-linear microeconomic behavior. For example, recent research has emphasized the importance of non-convex adjustment costs in explaining the empirical properties of labor demand at the micro level (see for example Caballero, Engel, & Haltiwanger, 1997, and Willis, 2004) . From the perspective of the analysis of section 7 Appendix A Solution of the Simulated Model Optimal Employment Policy. We follow Mortensen & Pissarides (1994) and assume idiosyncratic shocks evolve according to (17), withx U [ ; 1] so thatG (x) = x 1
. In this case, we can rewrite the recursion for the function D (n; x) in Proposition 3 as:
where (x) (1 )
. We then conjecture that the function D (n; x) is of the form D (n; x) = d 0 + d 1 (x). Substituting this into the latter, and equating coe¢ cients, we obtain the following solution for D (n; x):
Note also that di¤erencing the …rst-order conditions (13) and (14) in this case implies that:
. Using these two results, and after some tedious algebra, one obtains the following closed-form solution for R v (n): 
Moreover, the optimal employment policy implies that, given n, x must lie in the interval [R (n) ; R v (n)], but is otherwise independently distributed. Thus:
where the last equality follows from the assumption of uniform idiosyncratic shocks in the simulation. Thus:
Moreover, the average marginal product of labor is simply given by
Average Wages. It follows from equation (9) that the average wage across …rms is given by:
To obtain the average wage across workers, which we denote w w , note that w w = E h n E(n) w (n; x) i where w (n; x) is the wage in a given …rm de…ned in (9). That is, it is the employmentweighted average of wages across …rms. Thus:
This has a very similar structure to the average wage across …rms. It follows that:
Finally, the average wage of new hires, which we denote w m , is equal to a hiring-weighted average of wages across hiring …rms. Noting from (12) that idiosyncratic productivity of hiring …rms is given by x = R v (n), we have that:
B Proofs
Conjecture 1 The optimal employment policy function is of the form speci…ed in (12).
We will later verify in the proof of Proposition 2 that the Conjecture is consistent with the solution for the wage equation obtained in Proposition 1.
Proof of Proposition 1. Note …rst that, under the Conjecture, we can write the marginal surplus to a …rm recursively as:
In addition, we can write the value to a worker of unemployment as:
Upon …nding a job, which occurs with probability f , the new job must be in a …rm which is posting vacancies. This implies that the idiosyncratic productivity of the …rm, x 0 > R v (n), and that the level of employment in the hiring …rm, n = R 1 v (x 0 ). Moreover, since …rms di¤er in size, there is a distribution of employment levels, H (n), over which an unemployed worker will take expectations when evaluating the expected future bene…ts of being hired. It is useful to rewrite the worker's value of unemployment as:
Then note that, due to Nash sharing, the worker's surplus in an expanding …rm,
, and moreover that, by the …rst-order condition for a hiring …rm (see (4)), J (R 1 v (x 0 ) ; x) = c=q. Thus, we obtain the simple result:
The value of employment to a worker can be written as:
An employed worker's expected future payo¤ can be split into three regimes. If the …rm sheds workers next period (x 0 < R (n)) then the worker may separate from the …rm. We denote bys the probability that a worker separates from a …rm conditional on the …rm shedding workers. If the worker separates, she transitions into unemployment and receives a payo¤ U 0 . Otherwise she continues to be employed in a …rm of size n 0 = R 1 (x 0 ). Note that Nash sharing implies that
, and that, by the …rst-order condition,
In the event that a …rm freezes employment next period (x 0 2 [R (n) ; R v (n)]) then Nash sharing implies that W (n; x 0 ) U 0 = 1 J (n; x 0 ). Finally, in the event that the …rm hires next period,
. Thus, we have that:
Subtracting the value of unemployment to a worker from the latter, we obtain the following description of the worker's surplus:
Under Nash, this must be equal to 1 J (n; x), where J (n; x) is as derived in (40) so that we have:
as required.
Proof of Proposition 2.
Given the wage function in (9), it follows that the …rm's objective, (3), is continuous in (n 1 ; x) and concave in n. Thus, it follows from the Theorem of the Maximum that the …rm's optimal employment policy function is continuous in (n 1 ; x). Given this, it follows that the employment policy function must be of the form stated in Proposition 2. This veri…es that the Conjecture stated at the beginning of the appendix holds.
Proof of Proposition 3. First, note that one can re-write the continuation value conditional on each of the three possible continuation regimes:
where superscripts =0=+ refer to whether their are separations, a hiring freeze, or hires tomorrow. Thus we can write 31 :
31 Henceforth, "dG" without further elaboration is to be taken as "dG (x 0 jx)".
Taking derivatives with respect to n, recalling the de…nition of D ( ), and noting that, since (n; x 0 ) is continuous, it must be that (n; R (n)) = 0 (n; R (n)) and 0 (n; R v (n)) = + (n; R v (n)), yields:
Finally, using the Envelope conditions in Lemma 1 below, and substituting into (50) we obtain (15) and (16) in the main text:
To verify that C is a contraction mapping, we con…rm that Blackwell's su¢ cient conditions for a contraction hold here (see Stokey & Lucas, 1989, p.54) . To verify monotonicity, …x (n; x) = ( n; x), and takeD D. Then note that:
(52) Since ( n; x) were arbitrary, it thus follows that C is monotonic in D. To verify discounting, note that:
[C (D + a)] (n; x) = (CD) (n; x) + a [G (R v (n) jx) G (R (n) jx)] (CD) (n; x) + a (53) Since < 1 it follows that C is a contraction. It therefore follows from the Contraction Mapping Theorem that C has a unique …xed point.
Lemma 1
The value function de…ned in (3) has the following properties: n (n; x 0 ) = 0 (54) 0 n (n; x 0 ) = (1 )
Proof of Lemma 1. First, note that standard application of the Envelope Theorem implies that n (n; x 0 ) = 0 and + n (n; x 0 ) = c=q. It is only slightly less obvious what happens when n 0 = 0, i.e. when the employment is frozen next period. In this case, n 0 = n and this implies that: 0 (n; x 0 ) = px 0 F (n) w (n; x 0 ) n + Z (n; x 00 ) dG (x 00 jx 0 )
It therefore follows that: 0 n (n; x 0 ) = px 0 F 0 (n) w (n; x 0 ) w n (n; x 0 ) n + Z n (n; x 00 ) dG (x 00 jx 0 )
Since, by de…nition D (n; x 0 ) R n (n; x 00 ) dG (x 00 jx 0 ), the statement holds as required.
Proof of Proposition 4. First note that if x evolves according to (17), then we can rewrite the recursion for D (n; x) as: D (n; x) = 1 1
(1 ) (x) + 1 (1 ) (57) where ( (13) and (14) are increasing in x, because (x) is increasing in x. Thus, to establish that @R v =@p < 0 and @R=@p < 0, simply note that the function D (n; x) is also increasing in p and thus the LHS of (13) and (14) are increasing in p.
To ascertain the marginal e¤ects of we …rst need to establish the marginal e¤ect of on the function D (n; x). Rewriting f =q = and q = q ( ) in (57), di¤erentiating with respect to , and using the …rst-order conditions, (13) and (14), to eliminate terms we obtain:
where p 0 G (R v (n)) G (R (n)), p + 1 G (R v (n)), and p G [R (n)]. Note that D is independent of x. Di¤erentiating the …rst-order condition for a hiring …rm, (13), with respect to we obtain:
since q 0 ( ) < 0. Thus it follows that @R v =@ > 0. Likewise, di¤erentiating the …rst-order condition for a shedding …rm, (14), with respect to we obtain:
Thus, @R=@ > 0 () n > R , E (n) E (x 0 jx 0 2 [R (n) ; R v (n)]), and p 0 , p + are as de…ned in the Proof to Proposition 4.
Proof. Since …rms only receive an idiosyncratic shock with probability each period, we can use the recursion for J (n; x), (40), to write: J (n; x) = 1 1
(1 ) px n
1
(1 ) b c
We then conjecture that J (n; x) is of the form j 0 + j 1 x. Substituting this assumption into the latter, and equating coe¢ cients yields:
c q f p
Solving for j 0 we obtain the required solution for J (n; x). Likewise, we can obtain recursions for the marginal e¤ects of n and :
J n (n; x) = 1 1
1 n px n 1 + 1 (1 )
J n (n; x 0 ) dG J p (n; x) = 1 1
(1 ) x n 1 + 1 (1 )
Again using the method of undetermined coe¢ cients, and noting that the Cobb Douglas matching function implies q = =) c q 2 q 0 ( ) = c q , yields the required solutions for J n , J p and J .
Proof of Proposition 6. Total di¤erentiation of the JC condition, U ( ) = L E (n), yields d dp
. In steady state, the probabilities of raising, freezing, and cutting employment will all be constants. Denoting these probabilities as p + ; p 0 ; and p respectively, it follows that we can write:
for any variable . Note further that in steady state E (@n=@ ) = E (@n 1 =@ ) so that we obtain the result that:
where p + E (x 0 jx 0 2 [R ( n) ; R v ( n)]). Thus, using the results of Lemma 2 it follows that we can write:
and:
where 1 1 (1 )
. Substituting back into the aggregate elasticity of with respect to p, we obtain:
Noting that the marginal product of labor in the average-sized …rm is equal to pE ( n) n 1 , and assuming is su¢ ciently small, we obtain:
wherep pE ( n) n 1 + (1 ) pE ( n) n 1 and
()
, as required.
